The accounting standardization project, kicked off by the passage of US securities laws in the 1930s, has steadily gained momentum over seven decades. Today, written standards dominate accounting thought, practice, regulation, instruction, even research. Generally accepted accounting principles-originally a mere description in its plain English meaning-have since been capitalized into a proper name-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles-and the phrase now describes rules and regulations issued by authorities with power to inflict punishment on those who do not choose to accept them. How and why did financial reporting get caught in the standardization project, replacing social norms of corporate and professional behavior by written rules and standards? What are the consequences of this transformation? What alternative courses are available to accounting and corporate governance? I argue that heavy reliance on the codification of financial reporting has been a wrong path. A shift from rules towards norms of behavior may yet help accounting and corporate governance recover a better balance. q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Samuel Johnson published his dictionary not as the conqueror of the language but as the person who knew best how unconquerable it really is. Verlyn Klinkenborg (2005) The rules of accounting, even more than those of law, are the product of experience rather than logic. George O. May (1943) The accounting standardization project, kicked off by the passage of US securities laws in the 1930s, has steadily gained momentum over the past seven decades. Today, written standards dominate accounting thought, practice, regulation, instruction, and research. In the US, generally accepted accounting principles-originally a mere description in its plain English meaning of being generally accepted-have since been capitalized into a proper name-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)-the phrase now describes rules and regulations issued by authorities with power to inflict punishment on those who do not choose to accept them. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) supported by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US, and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), supported by the European Union's regulatory authorities are the institutional embodiments of this approach.
How and why did financial reporting get caught in the standardization project to replace norms and personal responsibility by written rules and standards? What are the consequences of this transformation? What alternative courses are available to accounting and corporate governance? I argue that heavy reliance on standards-based financial reporting, rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of legal reasoning and process on the part of accountants and their regulators, may have led accounting to focus narrowly on the objectivity of individual numbers, sacrificing fairness of the big picture. A balance between the roles of rules and norms is desirable not only in law, but also in other aspects of our social life such as family, neighborhood, drug and alcohol abuse, workplace, dress, table manners, and sports. A shift in emphasis from standards towards norms may yet help accounting and corporate governance recover a sustainable and efficient balance.
Accounting abuses
Widespread accounting abuses and their consequences continue to reverberate in US courts, government, regulatory agencies, and the media. European business has not entirely escaped these problems. The US response has been an overhaul of the corporate accounting and auditing regime through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The new Act gave additional powers to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), imposed additional requirements on the certification of internal controls; and created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee audits of public firms, to write auditing rules, and to monitor audit firms and the industry. Whether the Act will effectively tackle the problems it was supposed to address depends on how the purported causes of accounting and auditing failures are related to the actual causes. So far, it remains an open question.
In the following analysis, I assume that the frequency and the scope of corporate accounting and auditing failures in the US were unusual, unexpected, undesirable, and unacceptable. Frequencies of restatements of financial reports, accounting-related enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (see Exhibit 1), court cases, as well as the out-of-court settlements-all exhibited a sharp rise in recent years. There was an increase in the volume of media attention devoted to corporate financial shenanigans. However, it was not a case of self-perpetuated media frenzy. The comparison of the volume of such incidents with historical levels establishes their unusual nature. There was little indication in the late nineties that this deluge of accounting and audit failures was imminent.
Diagnosis is a prerequisite to finding a cure. The causes of audit and accounting failures can be examined in three time perspectives-immediate causes of the past few years, intermediate causes of the past quarter century, and long term causes that can be traced back to events and decisions over the past century.
I touch only briefly on the immediate causes; they have been analyzed in great detail by many others, and I have little to add. From a policy perspective, the intermediate and longterms issues deserve more of our attention. I outline the intermediate term problems before moving on to the longer term issues which constitute the main topic of this paper.
Immediate, intermediate and long term causes
The immediate causes of audit and accounting failures lay in the beliefs of many corporate executives, auditors, lawyers, investment and commercial bankers and corporate directors that they could default on their respective duties in the corporate governance network without forfeiting the rewards promised to them in exchange. Such beliefs were compounded by the failure of government and regulatory agencies to discipline the individual failures in the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 Law is taking its course as various cases of fraud, negligence, and insider trading wind their way through the courts. Let us hope that many, if not all, corporate governance transgressions can be remedied by conscientious, not zealous, enforcement of the existing laws. So far, the signs on whether such hopes are justified are mixed. Newspapers report a scarcity of qualified people who are willing to serve as the directors of public companies. They also report the unwillingness of nominating committees to choose technically qualified but out-of-network people for the boards.
1 Audit committees of boards of directors are more likely to consist of non-employee directors today than a few years ago, 2 but we do not yet know if such directors would better serve the interests of the shareholders. The stock option-grant rates slowed down in 2002, 3 but not the rapid rise of senior executive compensation. 4 In the intermediate perspective of a few decades, these failures can be attributed to the late seventies' US government decision to push for a more competitive audit industry in the hope of increasing its allocative efficiency (Sunder, 2003) . These policies, in turn, were driven by the dominant economic theories of the moment and supported by the Supreme Court of the US through its decisions (e.g. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350, 1977) . The quality of audit services being practically unobservable to shareholders, the market for audit services is a textbook example of a 'market for lemons' (see Ackerlof, 1970) . Application of the general theory (that competition promotes economic efficiency) to the audit industry led to a sharp decline in the price of audit services in the early eighties. This was followed by a drop in the quality of these services, and attempts by audit firms to find alternative sources of revenue in order to survive. The consequences of this precipitous fall in prices and the quality of audit services-a characteristic of a market for lemons-combined with the increased temptation to commit accounting fraud with the growth of performance-contingent executive compensation (Erickson et al., 2005) were played out over two decades. A sharp drop in the economy and the stock market often expose accumulated flaws that receive little attention during the boom. Not surprisingly, the dotcom bust brought the house down.
In the broader perspective of a century, another pattern emerges. At least since the first decade of the twentieth century, the US has seen a steady shift in financial reporting from business and professional norms towards legislated written standards enforced by threats of explicit punishment for violators (see Sivakumar and Waymire, 2003) . This shift was accelerated by the introduction of US internal revenue in the second decade and by the securities laws in [1933] [1934] . It has fundamentally altered virtually all aspects of accounting, and the recent collapse can be seen as a logical consequence of the decisions taken over the past seven decades.
1 Plich (2003) 
Social norms and accounting
Norms of a social group can be defined as the common knowledge expectation of its members about how others behave in various circumstances. 5 Wearing a coat and tie in an office is in social norm if, even in the absence of formal rules and enforcement process, and in the presence of available and convenient alternatives, people do in fact wear a coat and tie and expect others to do the same. In this sense, social norms or conventions are indistinguishable from the culture of the group (Sunder, 2002c) .
Unlike formal rules and regulations, motivation to conform to social norms is rooted in the anticipation, or even fear, of others' disapproval of deviations for the norms. Social norms may be so internalized by individuals that conformity may be seen as a moral or ethical obligation. When norms become sufficiently internalized, the members of the group may find it unnecessary to monitor conformity, giving rise to trust. A large body of literature in psychology (Cook, 2001) , sociology (Granovetter, 1985) , and political science (Putnam, 1993) suggests that key trust creation mechanisms in society are personal relationships and social embeddedness of market participants rather than legal rules and formal enforcement structures.
It has been so long since accountants shifted their allegiance and attention away from norms that the authoritative promulgation of accounting practices is often assumed to be synonymous with progress or advancement of accounting. In his Lectures on Forging Accounting Principles in Five Countries, Zeff (1972, 1-2) wrote: "The English Institute became involved in the authoritative establishment of accounting principles perhaps more by evolution than deliberate policy . [I]t was not until the last month of the 1960s, however, that developments in accounting research and the establishment of accounting principles began to quicken their pace. By the outset of the 1970s, an energetic and ambitious plan was in operation." It is easy to identify the history of accounting principles with organized efforts to produce written rules because documentary traces of such processes are more easily available for the historians; social norms, even if they are widely accepted, leave nary a footprint in the public record. We can see the evidence of norms in fiction.
6,7 However, accounting is hardly a favorite subject in English or other literature. The shift from norms to standards has been halting and gradual. The predominance of norms is clear from the charge the American Association of Public Accountants gave to a Special Committee on Accounting Terminology in April 1909 "to collate and arrange accounting words and phrases and show in connection with each the varying usages to which they are put. . This committee will not attempt to determine the correct or even the preferable usage where more than one is in existence." (Zeff, 1971, p. 112) .
In 1918, a reprint of a memorandum on auditing procedures, prepared by the American Institute of Accountants, and approved by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and 5 Common knowledge of X, in its technical meaning, is shared knowledge among two or more people so each knows X, knows that others know X, knows that everyone knows that everyone else knows X, ad infinitum. 6 For examples of accounting and commerce in Chaucer and Goethe and other German literature, see Russell (1986) , Gallhofer and Haslan (1991) , Jackson (1992) , Ganim (1996) , Maltby (1997); Parker (1999), and Evans (2005) .
7 Waymire (personal communication) suggests that researchers have rarely ventured to examine the internal correspondence and discussions of client and audit firms where they might find the 'footprints' of social norms. originally published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, was labeled 'A Tentative Proposal Submitted by the Federal Reserve Board for the Consideration of Banks, Bankers, and Banking Associations; Merchants, Manufacturers, and Associations of Manufacturers; Auditors, Accountants, and Associations of Accountants.' The intent was to coordinate the evolution of a norm, and not to impose a standard.
In the same year, the American Institute of Accountants appointed a Special Committee on Interest in Relation to Cost to address a lively controversy on imputed interest as part of the cost of production. The Committee's recommendation against inclusion of imputed interest in cost of production, and its approval at the annual meeting of the Institute, did not become accepted as an accounting norm. The Institute went on to appoint a special committee on the standardization of accounting procedure "to consider all questions of procedure brought before it, and to make recommendations from time to time on vexed questions in the hope that ultimately there may be established something approaching uniformity of procedure throughout the country" (Zeff, 1971, p. 116) . Again, the charge suggests facilitation to create norms, not legislation of standards. During its eleven-year tenure (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) , the Committee produced six reports, and none was submitted for an official stamp of approval of the Institute's membership.
The absence of authoritative standards of accounting did not mean that the world of accounting had less order in the early twentieth century than in the early twenty-first. Zeff discusses several active mechanisms the accountants of the day might have used to identify the norms of their profession. First, the pages of the Journal of Accountancy and perhaps CPA Journal served as forums for active, even feisty debates on accounting and auditing; a function largely abandoned by the accounting journals over the past quarter century as authoritative standards pushed the norms out. During 1920 During -1929 , the Librarian of the Institute issued 33 'special bulletins' on topics referred to them, albeit without the authority of the Institute. In 1931, the Institute published a 126-page book Accounting Terminology, a compilation of accounting terms and their definitions as a matter of advice, not authority. 8 Throughout the 1920s and into 1930s, a committee of the Institute worked in close cooperation with a committee of Robert Morris Associates, an organization of bank loan officers, to respond to inquiries submitted to them.
The stock market crash of 1929, and the economic depression that followed, also precipitated another crash-in the trust in norms of accounting and the formal or informal mechanisms by which these norms evolved and were sustained. So much wealth, livelihoods, even lives, had been lost for which the prevailing norms took the blame. The social contract was broken; it was time to identify and punish-or at least constrain-the guilty. Politicians responded in the only way they could and introduced securities laws and regulations to replace the norms as well as private innovation as a response to adverse events. 9 In the following seven decades, accounting and audit failures were interpreted as evidence that norms do not work; norms were gradually shifted to the back burner, and legislated accounting standards rose to dominate accounting. Have the standards achieved, and can they achieve, their purported goal?
Federal securities regulation and accounting by standards
In 1933-1934, the US Congress created the SEC, and gave it the legal authority to regulate financial reporting. Until then, financial reporting practice was governed largely by norms and conventions, and the first three decades of regulation were devoted largely to codifying these conventions. Gradually, these efforts shifted from identification of conventions, social norms and common law to promulgation of bureaucratically enforceable standards. The shift is also reflected in the increasingly assertive nomenclature of the three private sector organizations that wrote accounting rules and how they labeled their publications: The Committee on Accounting Procedure's Accounting Research Bulletins (1939 Bulletins ( -1959 , the Accounting Principles Board's Opinions (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) , and the FASB's Financial Accounting Standards (1973 to present). The IASB's International Financial Reporting Standards are the latest addition to this trend.
At the beginning of the 21st century, few people seem to be aware of the social norm, convention, or common law approach of the earlier era, and such an approach has hardly any advocates left. While Hatfield (1927, pp. 537-539) cites 131 legal cases, FASB and SEC's pronouncements have crowded the common law out of the US textbooks. The US, followed by many others in the world, now favors the more formal legislated standards (with legal enforcement) model for financial reporting. Yet, the evidence that formal standards do any better than social norms of financial reporting remains elusive, and the case for the efficacy of enforced standards remains to be made. In the absence of evidence, should the benefit of doubt go to the government or the market? I am inclined to accept Thoreau's motto: "that government is best which governs least."
10 At the very least, we should not proceed with the assumption that standards dominate social norms. We need a better understanding of how norms emerge, how they interact with formal rules, and how we might achieve an efficient balance between the two.
Standards or norms
Written standards with formal enforcement are concrete and salient. Extant standards are published, easily disseminated, specified formally with some precision, and can be cited, analyzed and discussed line and verse.
11 They come into existence at a specific time, through a known and understood institutional process that may allow the participation of the constituents. When the environment changes or the standards are no longer perceived to induce the desired patterns of behavior, a systematic process is available to formulate changes and submit them to a well-specified process for possible promulgation.
A transparent institutional mechanism for setting and modifying standards holds a natural appeal in a democratic polity. Following accidents and scandals, 'the rules were not clear' is a popular defense for scoundrels and managers who have not adopted good data handling practices. Codification of standards-let us make the rules clear to all-is a frequently chosen response to calm the political waters.
12 Formal written standards also appeal to our sense of good housekeeping.
Social conventions and norms are less well defined, vary in time and space, and require an extended socialization process to learn and understand (Coleman, 1990) . Conventions carry a penumbra of uncertainty about the edges; there is substantial but incomplete overlap among the beliefs of the individual members of a group about its norms. Even with a unique definition in time or place, norms evolve in small, almost imperceptible steps, by processes that are neither observable nor well understood. The evolution of norms is decentralized in the extreme, and even experts find it difficult to know which rules or practices are better, and to predict their future direction. While the evolutionary process is not opaque, the lack of definition and our poor understanding of how norms evolve make them less transparent. Scandals and crises, when they occur, mock the claims of expertise and efficiency required to legitimize existing institutions. It is hardly surprising, then, that during periods of crisis, political or bureaucratic decision makers feel pressure to displace market processes and write new standards instead of relying on existing (recently discredited) norms and business practices.
Formal standards call for formal enforcement mechanisms to be effective. Government departments, courts, regulatory agencies, industry associations, and private sector organizations in national and international domains help monitor the implementation of various kinds of standards, and furnish procedures to impose penalties on violators. Formal enforcement of informal social conventions is difficult outside a common law system. However, social relationships among business participants make it possible to create a 'word-of-mouth' mechanism where feedback and reputation can be enhanced (or damaged) rapidly, and a sense of community can be formed among interested parties (see Bernstein, 2001 on the example of cotton trade). New Internet technologies make it possible for people to significantly expand these social networks (Dellarocas, 2003) . 11 See Fuller (1964) and Dworkin (1986) ] for discussion of natural law theory, and Hechter and and Opp (2001) for an overview of the sociology of norms.
12 In response to William Z. Ripley's Atlantic Monthly (September 1926) article, 'Stop, Look, Listen!' accusing large corporations of dishonest and deceptive financial reporting practices, even George O. May said: ". it seems to me that the extension of the independent audit, accompanied by a clearer definition of the authority and responsibility of auditors, is one of the most valuable remedies to be found for the defects of which Professor Ripley complains.". May was an influential leader of the US accounting profession and seemed to favor norms over standards.
The idea of social norms works not only within countries but internationally. The human rights movement has been a major force in changing government policies in many parts of the world. The US, so zealous in guarding its sovereignty against international encroachments, seems to be yielding to evolving international norms on the death penalty for minor and mentally retarded offenders. On March 1, 2005, the US Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for those under 18 when they committed their crimes. By doing so, 'the self-proclaimed beacon of freedom in the world parted company of China, Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen-the only other countries in the world that executed minor offenders ' (Economist, 2005) . Perhaps the US Supreme Court yielded to the pressure of slowly evolving international norms. Although the death penalty remains in place for adult murderers, the US is still out of step with most of its friends, and may yield to international norms in the future.
13
With all its apparent advantages of clarity, explicitness, and the power of enforcement, the standards approach also suffers from several disadvantages relative to the evolutionary or social convention approach to regulation. Inductively derived accounting principles (see Littleton, 1953, Chapter 11) have yielded ground to the idea that they can be deduced from some basic assumptions or axioms (e.g. FASB, 1978; Bullen and Crook, 2005; Dopuch and Sunder, 1980; Bromwich et al., 2005 ). 
Design and evolution
Although they are often presented in contradistinction to each other, design and evolution are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Evolution consists of a large number of elements that include both events as well as conscious actions. Some or all of these actions can be conscious design efforts which must compete for acceptance and survival in a crowded environment. A particular kind of car is the result of conscious, intelligent, design by its creators. However, the evolution of an automobile over time occurs through interaction among hundreds or thousands of such design efforts by firms and their engineers. There is little reason to think of design and evolution as being mutually exclusive except when a design is considered as the final choice not subject to competition to prove its worth over the alternatives. 13 The Economist (2005): "In the Supreme Court's majority opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court acknowledged "the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty". While the court explicitly said that foreign opinions, legal or moral, are not binding in American law, they were nonetheless "respected and significant confirmation" for Tuesday's ruling. . But it is not the first such case. In the 2002 ruling in Lawrence v Texas, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute forbidding private homosexual conduct. The court ruled that: "Where a case's foundations have sustained serious erosion, criticism from other sources is of greater significance.
[T]o the extent Bowers [a previous case that had upheld the antisodomy law] relied on values shared with a wider civilization, the case's reasoning and holding have been rejected by the European Court of Human Rights, and other nations have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct."
14 Waymire (personal correspondence) suggests that the problem may lie in the fact that most people find it harder to understand and appreciate spontaneous processes (Hayek, 1988) ; Cartesian perspective of explicitly designed processes and outcomes is more easily comprehended.
In the following section we examine these issues in the context of e-commerce; much of what we have to say is also applicable to financial reporting.
Norms versus standards in e-commerce
How can we know if a switch to a regime which places greater emphasis on norms and less on standards would work? We cannot be sure, but we can learn important lessons from historical experience in accounting, as well as in other aspects of our social experience including e-commerce, drugs and alcohol abuse, and law. When visiting e-commerce sites, few people actually read the fine print of their privacy policies. Few people read the license agreements of software. As with financial reports, attitudes towards privacy on the Internet hardly distinguish among sites. This tendency generates an externality among Internet transactions across sites, as well as among financial analyses across reports of various firms. While the individual amounts involved in the internet purchase transactions, and the financial investment transactions may differ by one or more orders of magnitude, the externality issues between financial reporting and internet commerce have significant similarities; a claim that they are the same would be an overstatement.
The UK (and the European Union) chose to protect the privacy of their citizens by legislating standards to be monitored and enforced under the powers of government. The US, on the other hand, chose, through deliberation or default, to allow the privacy policies in e-commerce to evolve as norms or conventions of e-commerce without legislated standards or a punitive enforcement mechanism. Jamal et al. (2005) compared the performance of these two regimes with respect to two aspects of privacy. They found that the number of email messages sent to those who do not give consent to receive such messages, is almost identical under the two regimes. Most e-commerce sites honor the choice exercised by the registrants. Registrants who indicate their willingness to receive commercial email messages receive a comparable level of message traffic under the two regimes (Exhibit 2).
They also report that on the notice/awareness dimension (i.e., participants receiving timely notice of an entity's information and privacy policies), the overall performance of the standards and enforcement regime of the UK is about the same as that of the evolutionary regime of the US (Exhibit 3).
In the absence of legislated standards and their government enforcement, a market for web assurance services, including privacy assurance, has arisen in the US. About a third of the US websites chose to pay a small fee to the sellers of such services (e.g. TRUSTe and BBB Online) and had them certify that: (1) privately developed standards of the assurance service provider, and (2) the website practices conformed to the website's stated policies (see Jamal et al., 2003) . On the whole the US websites that displayed the service providers' assurance seals performed as well or better than the UK websites in protecting the privacy of their users. The legislation and enforcement mechanisms in the UK and the European Union were set up on the assumption that they would help improve privacy on the Internet. Yet, the comparative study of the UK and the US reveals that privacy has fared no better in the UK than in the unregulated US e-commerce environment. In particular, formal regulation does not provide protection from the extreme behavior of a few websites. This is consistent with what we observe in financial reporting: Enron, WorldCom, Fannie Mae, and other companies were mired in massive accounting scandals in the most extensively regulated financial reporting environment in the world.
Failures of market and regulation
Regulation is often proposed as a solution for market failures. Regulation, too, is subject to failure (see Djankov et al., 2003) . In this section, I consider four possible reasons why formal standards and their enforcement, with their apparent advantages, may not necessarily dominate social norms in financial reporting. I label them as the information, design, gaming and signaling problems. The argument here is not that social norms dominate regulation; instead, we need careful judgment to balance the reliance on the two instruments.
The information problem
Rule makers face a difficult problem of identifying good rules. This difficulty becomes apparent by asking: what is a good rule for determining interference in a game of soccer? Rules affect many members of society in diverse ways. The direct effect of the rules on people depends on their individual circumstances that the rule maker knows little about. Rules are designed in the hope that they will change or constrain the behavior of at least some people. This change also depends on the individual circumstances not known to the rule maker. Changes in the behavior of individuals interact in complex ways to generate aggregate consequences that are difficult to anticipate. The rule maker may try to ameliorate this informational disadvantage by soliciting information from the parties potentially affected by its actions. Unfortunately, these parties have little incentives to report truthfully, and their strategic responses only muddy the waters (see Sunder, 1997, Chapter 11, and Sunder, 2003) , and create the gaming problem discussed below, often forcing the rule maker to deal with unintended consequences of the rules.
In social norms and conventions, as in biology, evolution proceeds in fits and starts, with no assurance of progress. There is no organized or well-understood mechanism for initiation or diffusion and acceptance of changes in norms. Each small or large change in norms is induced by, and induces changes in, individual behavior; moving the social system to a new, albeit temporary, expectations equilibrium (see Sunder, 2002c) . People get the chance to experience the consequences of each change, and adjust their behavior to the new circumstances. Individuals process information that rule makers cannot capture for their decision-making; yet such dispersed and diverse information can get aggregated into these outcomes through market and other social processes (see Hayek, 1945; Plott and Sunder, 1988) . For this reason the evolved social norms often incorporate more information than the rules made by legislature, boards, and other corporate entities. On the flip side of the argument, social norms can get stuck in a rut (i.e., a local optimum), and fail to respond to changed circumstances and new information.
The design problem
The corporate entities for setting standards need a structure, people, and resources. All three requirements force compromises in the design of the entity. Legislative structures emphasize representativeness; judicial structures emphasize impartiality, while bureaucratic structures value rules of procedure above all. It is not possible to attain perfect representativeness, impartiality, and consistency of procedure all at once. Finding the people to operate the rule-making system raises parallel problems. The best experts may not be representative or impartial, and they may be inclined to use their judgment instead of following pre-defined procedures. Representative bodies may lack expertise in the substance of the matter, and do not place impartiality high on their agenda, and so on. Finally, those who pay for the cost of developing standards seek to further their own agenda through their influence over the finances of the standard-setting entity. Such inevitable compromises 'corrupt' the standard-setting bodies.
The gradual evolution of social conventions can be said to be free of these weaknesses of corporate entities because such entities do not play a major role in the process. However, given the ill-defined, almost random process by which norms evolve, one cannot be sure that the weaknesses of structure, personnel and resources associated with regulatory bodies are necessarily dominated by social norms.
15 Again, we must find the right balance between the two through application of judgment.
The gaming problem
The difficulty posed by the information problem discussed above is compounded by the dynamics between rules and the behavior the rules are intended to influence. Each standard alters the decision environments of the relevant individuals and, at least potentially, alters their decisions. Standards also induce the individuals to search for new alternatives, or create opportunities that may not have existed earlier. The rule makers, with limited information, cannot anticipate all such change, and the rules often lead to unintended consequences in the form of individual behavior and their social outcomes. For example, Tan and Jamal (2003) found that reducing discretion in accounting rules has an unintended effect of changing the 'real' operating decisions of managers. Any adjustment of the rules to such outcomes sets up yet another cycle of adjustments and changes. Individuals can adjust faster than the rule makers can. It is difficult to make sure that this action-reaction sequence converges to a rule and pattern of behavior, which are in mutual equilibrium, and that this equilibrium is Pareto superior to the status quo.
Evolution of social norms is stretched out over a long period of time. Informality, flexibility and the longer time span allow opportunity for the game of actions and reactions to be played out among the participants as they learn the consequences of their own actions and about the reactions of others. Thus the norms, and the individual behavior they induce, have a fair change of reaching a mutual equilibrium. Whether such social norms equilibria are efficient remains a matter of debate (e.g. between the supporters and critics of Coase, 1960) .
The signaling problem
A formal standards approach to financial reporting favors narrowing the range of options available to the reporting entity. Many believe that a narrower set of choices available to the accounting entity in how to report a given event or transaction promotes comparability and consistency and enhances the value of financial statements. This argument ignores the signaling value of the choices made by the reporting entity. In making a choice from a given set of alternatives, the entity cannot help but reveal information it holds privately about its preferences and expectations. Managers of the entity reveal their privately held information, in part, through the financial reporting methods they choose (Dye, 1985) and (Levine, 1996) . The use of aggressive reporting methods gives valuable information to careful readers of the financial reports. Narrowing financial reporting choices through strict standards also eliminates the ability of managers to transmit information through their choice of financial reporting methods. This signaling aspect of financial reporting has received little attention in the setting of accounting standards.
Social norms may also induce individuals to choose some options over others. However, unlike regulation, narrowing the choices available to individuals is rarely achieved. Depending on the specific circumstances, a broader range of behavior remains permissible and acceptable. The more tightly specified the school dress code, the less one can learn about individual children from their appearance in the playground; without choice and self-expression, less information is available to others. CCC is a great language to efficiently write code to run in the well-defined operating system of a computer, but not for poetry or conversation in open environments where signaling aspects of language cannot be ignored. Morison (1970, p. 281) wrote:
The power of free and rational argument remains, I am old-fashioned enough to believe, the best road to the truth in human affairs. I would therefore give companies the maximum freedom to present their accounts in whatever way they thought fit, and would then require them to explain and justify the course they had taken. The auditor's task-no light one!-would be to ensure that they did. And to see they did it fairly.
The information, design, gaming and signaling problems are ever-present in setting standards; they deserve consideration when we weigh the roles of standards and norms in financial reporting.
Limits of standards and rules
Legal scholarship and practice is careful in recognizing the limits of the efficacy of written rules. When it is not possible to write a rule that will improve the state of affairs compared to a judgment-based system, the law leaves the judgment in place, irrespective of the importance of the question at hand. When a judge asks the jury to determine if the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt, lay jurors would want to know how much doubt is reasonable: ten percent, two percent, or one percent? Law does not attempt to codify answers to such questions. Legislators and lawyers understand all too well the consequences of clarifying such questions can be even less desirable than the consequences of leaving the answers to judgment, even when the judgment is to be exercised by laymen. Similarly, the SEC and US Congress refuse to clarify the definition of insider trading beyond 'trading on non-public information.' Again, the consequences of clarifications are even less desirable than the consequences of leaving such matters to ex post judgment.
Accountants, on the other hand, have been willing to pursue endless clarification of accounting rules to the point of defining the percentage thresholds for materiality, lease capitalization, consolidation, and non-consolidation of special purpose entities, etc. With such written standards in place it is child's play for the Wall Street bankers, accountants, and lawyers to design transactions to frustrate the intent of the standards, no matter how carefully they have been drafted. Setting up accounting institutions such as the FASB and the IASB, whose sole function is to issue new accounting rules, has contributed to the tendency to write standards which are 'generally accepted' only in the sense of 'follow them, or else..' Accountants could borrow some wisdom from law, abolish the rulemaking monopolies in various jurisdictions, and introduce elements of competition among rule makers with each financial reporting jurisdiction in order to avoid this problem (Dye and Sunder, 2001; Sunder, 2002a,b) .
In financial reporting, the legal requirement of an independent audit of publicly-held firms seems to serve as an obstacle to the efficient functioning of a market for audit services. If independent audit were not a legal requirement, firms with sufficient confidence in their accounts and in their prospects would spend the money to hire reputable independent auditors to convince their shareholders about their transparency and good prospects. Firms without such confidence will not find it worthwhile to hire such auditors. Investors, presented with reports with and without auditor certificates will have to make their own risk assessments and price the securities accordingly. Without government regulation, a market for certification or audit services would develop analogous to the US market for web services in e-commerce. Jamal et al. (2003) adduce evidence of a web certification market for privacy assurance. DeWally and Ederington (2006) analyze the evolution and functioning of an audit certification service for online comic book auctions on eBay. Instead of allowing such a market to develop endogenously, the SEC requires all firms to have their reports audited and, following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, tries to specify (through the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) the standards by which the auditing must be carried out. It can be argued that the extensive regulation of audit practice has been accompanied by commoditization of the audit and has contributed to the widespread auditing scandals of the recent years.
In the absence of mandated standards, US websites tend to view the disclosure of privacy policies as an instrument of their marketing strategy to attract consumers. Accordingly, they make it easy to find their statements of policy and adhere to these policies reasonably closely. UK websites, on the other hand, appear to view privacy disclosure as merely a compliance matter; they appear to be, at the very least, indifferent to consumer concerns about their privacy policies; and on average, make it more difficult than in US for their customers to find their statements of policy.
Proponents of government regulation of e-commerce privacy are thus likely to be disappointed after passage of a privacy law. At best, a privacy law may evolve through iterations to keep up with changing technology used to encroach upon consumer privacy. At worst, a privacy law may provide false comfort to consumers, and actually impair privacy practices of websites. At present, it is unclear whether a formal legal regime is better able to evolve to keep up with a rapidly changing technology.
Dye points out that in stationary environment standards and norms are likely to coincide. 16 On the other hand, is it faster and less error prone for informal norms to evolve in response to the changing environment? There is not enough evidence yet about the relative abilities of law and social norms to respond efficiently to environmental changes. Sunder (1984 Sunder ( , 1988 Sunder ( and 1997 suggests stability of standards as a desirable feature of accounting environment, other things being the same, so that people have opportunity to adjust their behavior and arrive at a steady state if no transactions innovation occurs. However, the existence of a standard setting mechanism encourages, indeed invites, interpretive innovation as well as transactions innovation. This stimulation of demand for standards is less likely to arise in a regime of evolving norms. Deviant managers and accountants would have to contend with the uncertainty of ex post resolution of whether their acts are judged to be acceptable. By trying to 'make the rules clear' in advance, the FASB and the IASB encourage both transaction as well as interpretive innovation, paradoxically making it less likely that we shall ever arrive in a steady state of an ideal set of standards, even if the economic environment were to remain unchanged.
We cannot yet make definitive judgments about whether law must displace informal social norms for a market to succeed. We believe it is more likely that both accounting and e-commerce privacy jurisdictions will settle on some combination of the two approaches that relies partially on regulation as well as evolved norms.
This belief is reinforced by Cheit's (1990) comparison of protective standards written by four pairs of public agencies and private organizations operating in the same space: grain elevators, woodstoves, aviation fire safety, and gas space heaters. He questions the economics and political science theories (e.g. Stigler, 1971; Wilson, 1980) about the relative nature and efficacy of safety standards set by government agencies and private organizations, and he finds little evidence to support any of them in the field data. He shows that hundreds of little-known organizations (e.g. Underwriters Laboratories and the National Fire Protection Association) follow rigorous due process, and their standards play significant roles in regulation, directly, as well as through incorporation, into government laws and regulations. This is not to say that private standards are generally better or worse than public standards. Insufficient information is available to reach a conclusion. There are reasons both to doubt and to believe the conventional wisdom about public and private regulation. What is needed is more detailed information about the similarities and differences between standards setting in the public and private sectors (Cheit, 1990) .
The same regulatory space is often occupied by both government and non-government organizations with little systematic evidence on the circumstances in which one kind of standards is more desirable than the other. Kelman's (1981) comparative study shows that two seemingly different regulatory regimes of workplace safety and health in the US and Sweden produced surprisingly similar results. There seems to be no body of theory or evidence to guide policy makers in choosing between public and private mechanisms for a given standards and regulatory task.
Concluding remarks
Making a choice between standards and norms, and defining the extent of their respective roles in financial reporting, are not easy tasks. Standard-setters find it difficult to know which standards are superior, and what are to be the criteria for ranking the alternative standards. Corporate cost of capital is perhaps more defensible than others (see Sunder, 2002a,b) ; however, being an ex ante concept, it is difficult to measure with sufficient precision. Societies that depend on norms and tradition often get stuck in inefficient solutions (e.g. slavery) and it may take reform movements, even armed uprising, to release them.
Recent research in banking (Barth et al., 2004) and securities regulation (Romano, 2002; La Porta et al., 2003) examines the possibility of regulatory failures, especially when public as opposed to private enforcement is the primary instrument of regulation. In financial reporting, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposed an accounting regulator (the SEC) as well as a mandatory requirement to have an independent audit. The simultaneous imposition of both requirements has led to a general perception that enforced standards of accounting and a market for auditing services are complementary. Instead, accounting regulation and auditing may be substitutes.
Commoditization of the financial statement audit may have been speeded up by extensive regulation of financial accounting. A recent attempt by the audit profession (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA]) to divorce auditing from accounting (hence the move from audit to 'assurance services') is also consistent with the argument that extensive regulation of financial reporting reduces the demand for auditing. The link between regulation of financial accounting and private demand for auditing may not be as direct, as is often assumed in the accounting literature.
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Recent months have seen a revival of the old debate about the degree to which financial reporting should rely on detailed rules versus broad principles of accounting. Any shift in the emphasis between rules and principles implies a corresponding change in reliance on formal enforcement and norms of behavior. The consensus seems to be shifting toward placing more weight on principles. The findings of the Jamal et al. (2005) study that raise questions about the effectiveness of enforced law in enhancing e-commerce privacy can be usefully considered in this light.
Law, auditors, reputation, business norms and practices, warranties, disclosure, and industry associations are various trust-creation mechanisms associated with markets. The value of each mechanism depends on which other mechanisms are available in a particular market. Although each mechanism may be useful in isolation, the marginal value of some over others may be small. Perhaps, the value of legal regulation and enforcement may be overestimated when the availability of alternative trust generation mechanisms is ignored in studies of accounting regulation. Future research can help us understand the incremental value of formal legal regulation and enforcement in situations where other trust-creation mechanisms are available.
By their very nature, social norms (and culture) are specific to the society they serve. Variations in evolved systems, like in the beaks of the finches inhabiting various valleys of the Galapagos Islands, or in wedding ceremonies in various parts of the world, are not explainable entirely in terms of identifiable factors. Random chance and history also play a role. Attempts to harmonize financial reporting across the world assume that all crosscountry variation in financial reporting practices is random or at least that the advantages of dispensing with such variations exceed any reduction in the fit between the local economic environments and the financial reports. The practices proposed for universal use are those prevalent in the English-speaking countries, especially US and UK. Such ethnocentricity would be rejected in most other fields of social sciences but it has remained largely unchallenged in financial reporting.
Is it possible to tame the financial reporting practices of corporations through substantial, if not exclusive, reliance on written rules and punishment for violations? While the standard setters erect short sections of fence in the vicinity the lion was last 17 The AICPA and the Big 4 accounting firms failed to penetrate the e-commerce privacy assurance market, which is currently dominated by TRUSTe and BBB Online. The AICPA focused its online Web seal (WEBTRUST) on selling assurance with respect to business practices (internal control) and security, not privacy, and found that there is little demand for what they offered at the high prices they demanded. DeWally and Ederington (2006) document a thriving market for quality assurance services for comic books sold on eBay. Although eBay designated PepBoys as its official assurance provider for used cars sold on its system, the demand for this service appears to be small. spotted, the compensation committees of the boards throw red meat of juicy compensation packages encouraging hungry animals to walk around these flimsy barriers in the open jungle of financial reporting. A body of evidence on behavior of social animals suggests that beyond their physical needs, constraints and threats, norms of their own society play a significant role in what they do. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to think that, given the importance of our own extensive and complex social structures and norms in various walks of life, ignoring them in financial reporting may not be a wise course.
In the preface to his Dictionary, Johnson wrote that he found, instead of wilderness of ice, "the boundless chaos of a living speech." Can authority without social norms bring a semblance of order to the chaos to financial reporting? After seven decades of incessant effort, the answer stares us in the face.
